India argues that the Non-Proliferation Treaty creates a club of “nuclear possessions” and a larger group of “nothings” by limiting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never specifies why such a distinction is valid for ethical reasons. Pranab Mukherjee, Then Minister of Foreign Affairs of India, said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: “If India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not because of its lack of commitment to non-proliferation, but because we consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be an erroneous treaty and it does not recognize the need for universal and non-discriminatory revision and treatment.”  Although there have been informal discussions on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, including India and Pakistan, this is considered highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.  After about two years of EU3 diplomatic efforts and the temporary suspension of its enrichment programme by Iran, the IAEA Board of Governors found, in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, in a rarely non-consensual decision, with 12 abstentions, that these breaches constituted a breach of the IAEA safeguard agreement.  This was reported to the UN Security Council in 2006, after which the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment.  Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.  (Articles I, II, III): Nuclear-weapon States cannot transfer nuclear weapons to recipients and cannot induce the production or acquisition of NNWS. Non-weapon States must not receive nuclear weapons from another, and must not produce or acquire them. The NNWS must accept the security measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for all nuclear materials on its territory or under its control. The current arsenals are large, but they are only about one-fifth the size of half a century ago. While the superpower`s arms control and the end of the Cold War deserve most of the recognition of budget cuts (with China`s reluctance, especially by not building too much), the Non-Proliferation Treaty has created part of the broader political context and moral pressure that has led to these cuts.
While trying to prevent non-nuclear states from obtaining the bomb, its most important case also required that nuclear-weapon States reduce their arsenals and eventually eliminate them in order to set their own bargain objectives. Since the availability of fissile material has long been considered a major obstacle and a “pacing element” for the development of a country`s nuclear weapons, it was declared a priority of US policy in 2004 to prevent the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling (also known as ENR).  There is concern that countries with ENR capabilities may have the ability to use this capability to manufacture fissile material for the use of on-demand weapons, giving them what is known as the “virtual” nuclear weapons program.  The extent to which NPT members have a “right” to ENR technology, despite their potentially serious effects on dissemination, is therefore at the forefront of political and legal debates on the importance of Article IV and its relationship to Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Steven Pifer (@steven_pifer), Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative: Mike and Bob are right: the NPT has been largely successful. While in 1963, President Kennedy thought it was pessimistic that there could be up to 20 nuclear states by 1975, there are only nine left today. As a result of arms reduction agreements and unilateral decisions, Washington and Moscow have drastically reduced their nuclear arsenals from more than 30,000 and 40,000 weapons to today`s weapons arsenals of less than 4,500 weapons. Critics of nuclear-weapon-free states (United States, Russia, China, France and Royau